III. Aspects related to prudential management and direction - Asociación de Supervisores Bancarios de las Américas https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction?format=html Mon, 02 Jan 2017 21:12:44 +0000 en-GB hourly 1 Revisions to the Securitization Framework https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/capital-management-and-sufficiency/1423-revisions-to-the-securitization-framework?format=html Revisions to the Securitization Framework This securitization framework, which will come into effect in January 2018, forms part of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervisions’ broader agenda related to Basel III and intended to reform regulatory standards for banks in response to the global financial crisis, thus contributing to a more resilient banking sector. This framework updates the previous securitization framework published in December 2014, along with the alternative capital treatment for “simple, transparent and comparable” (terms aka STC) securitizations. 

]]> https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/capital-management-and-sufficiency/1423-revisions-to-the-securitization-framework?format=html This securitization framework, which will come into effect in January 2018, forms part of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervisions’ broader agenda related to Basel III and intended to reform regulatory standards for banks in response to the global financial crisis, thus contributing to a more resilient banking sector. This framework updates the previous securitization framework published in December 2014, along with the alternative capital treatment for “simple, transparent and comparable” (terms aka STC) securitizations. 

]]> (Anonymous) III.2 Capital management and sufficiency Mon, 02 Jan 2017 21:12:44 +0000 Measures to Reduce Misconduct https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/internal-controls/1422-measures-to-reduce-misconduct-risk-second-progress-report-1?format=html Measures to Reduce Misconduct In May 2015 the Financial Stability Board (FSB) agreed a work plan on measures to reduce misconduct risk, covering: (1) examining whether reforms to incentives, for instance to governance and compensation structures, are having sufficient effect on reducing misconduct; (2) examining whether steps are needed to improve global standards of conduct in the fixed income, commodities and currency (FICC) markets; and (3) coordinating reforms to other major financial threats. Collectively, these efforts are aimed at strengthening the resilience of the financial system by raising expectations for, as well as awareness of, good practice standards of behavior and conduct across markets and market participants. Therefore, this document presents a new wisdom of ethical conduct, compliant with the spirit of the corresponding applicable laws and regulations that is critical to foster public loyalty and confidence in the financial system.  

]]> https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/internal-controls/1422-measures-to-reduce-misconduct-risk-second-progress-report-1?format=html In May 2015 the Financial Stability Board (FSB) agreed a work plan on measures to reduce misconduct risk, covering: (1) examining whether reforms to incentives, for instance to governance and compensation structures, are having sufficient effect on reducing misconduct; (2) examining whether steps are needed to improve global standards of conduct in the fixed income, commodities and currency (FICC) markets; and (3) coordinating reforms to other major financial threats. Collectively, these efforts are aimed at strengthening the resilience of the financial system by raising expectations for, as well as awareness of, good practice standards of behavior and conduct across markets and market participants. Therefore, this document presents a new wisdom of ethical conduct, compliant with the spirit of the corresponding applicable laws and regulations that is critical to foster public loyalty and confidence in the financial system.  

]]> (Anonymous) III.3 Internal controls Mon, 02 Jan 2017 19:27:15 +0000 Creating a Culture of Risk Management https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/corporate-governance/banking-conduct-and-culture/729-aba?format=html Creating a Culture of Risk Management After the rash of corporate and accounting scandals leading up to the Sarbanes Oxley Act in 2002, a “Culture of Compliance” emerged to foster ethical behavior and decision-making. The culture of compliance goes beyond having good policies and procedures, a dedicated compliance staff, sufficient compliance resources or electronic exception reports. It articulates a sense of responsibility for compliance at every level of the organization.

]]> https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/corporate-governance/banking-conduct-and-culture/729-aba?format=html After the rash of corporate and accounting scandals leading up to the Sarbanes Oxley Act in 2002, a “Culture of Compliance” emerged to foster ethical behavior and decision-making. The culture of compliance goes beyond having good policies and procedures, a dedicated compliance staff, sufficient compliance resources or electronic exception reports. It articulates a sense of responsibility for compliance at every level of the organization.

]]> (Anonymous) III.1.1 Banking conduct and culture Wed, 11 Nov 2015 13:08:51 +0000 Guiding Principles for the Replacement of IAS 39 https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/accounting-ifrs/621-bcbs161-1?format=html Guiding Principles for the Replacement of IAS 39 The replacement of IAS 39 should improve the decision usefulness and relevance of financial reporting for stakeholders, including prudential regulators. Information is useful to users if it enables them to assess amounts, timing, and uncertainty of future cash flows of the reporting entity and stewardship and accountability of the entity’s management.

]]> https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/accounting-ifrs/621-bcbs161-1?format=html The replacement of IAS 39 should improve the decision usefulness and relevance of financial reporting for stakeholders, including prudential regulators. Information is useful to users if it enables them to assess amounts, timing, and uncertainty of future cash flows of the reporting entity and stewardship and accountability of the entity’s management.

]]> (Anonymous) III.4 Accounting IFRS Mon, 26 Oct 2015 16:25:03 +0000 Template for the input of data for the calculation of capital requirements of banks' default fund exposures to CCPs under Method 1 of the interim rules https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/capital-management-and-sufficiency/607-bcbs227-7?format=html Template for the input of data for the calculation of capital requirements of banks' default fund exposures to CCPs under Method 1 of the interim rules Template for the input of data for the calculation of capital requirements of banks' default fund exposures to CCPs under Method 1 of the interim rules

]]> https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/capital-management-and-sufficiency/607-bcbs227-7?format=html Template for the input of data for the calculation of capital requirements of banks' default fund exposures to CCPs under Method 1 of the interim rules

]]> (Anonymous) III.2 Capital management and sufficiency Mon, 26 Oct 2015 13:08:40 +0000 Corporate governance principles for banks https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/corporate-governance/173-corporate-governance-principles-for-banks-2?format=html Corporate governance principles for banks The primary objective of corporate governance should be safeguarding stakeholders’ interest in conformity with public interest on a sustainable basis. Among stakeholders, particularly with respect to retail banks, shareholders’ interest would be secondary to depositors' interest. Effective corporate governance is critical to the proper functioning of the banking sector and the economy as a whole. 

]]> https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/corporate-governance/173-corporate-governance-principles-for-banks-2?format=html The primary objective of corporate governance should be safeguarding stakeholders’ interest in conformity with public interest on a sustainable basis. Among stakeholders, particularly with respect to retail banks, shareholders’ interest would be secondary to depositors' interest. Effective corporate governance is critical to the proper functioning of the banking sector and the economy as a whole. 

]]> (Anonymous) III.1 Corporate Governance Tue, 30 Jun 2015 20:59:42 +0000 Corporate Governance Principles for Banks https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/corporate-governance/593-d328?format=html Corporate Governance Principles for Banks Effective corporate governance is critical to the proper functioning of the banking sector and the economy as a whole. Banks perform a crucial role in the economy by intermediating funds from savers and depositors to activities that support enterprise and help drive economic growth. Banks’ safety and soundness are key to financial stability, and the manner in which they conduct their business, therefore, is central to economic health. Governance weaknesses at banks that play a significant role in the financial system can result in the transmission of problems across the banking sector and the economy as a whole. 

]]> https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/corporate-governance/593-d328?format=html Effective corporate governance is critical to the proper functioning of the banking sector and the economy as a whole. Banks perform a crucial role in the economy by intermediating funds from savers and depositors to activities that support enterprise and help drive economic growth. Banks’ safety and soundness are key to financial stability, and the manner in which they conduct their business, therefore, is central to economic health. Governance weaknesses at banks that play a significant role in the financial system can result in the transmission of problems across the banking sector and the economy as a whole. 

]]> (Anonymous) III.1 Corporate Governance Tue, 30 Jun 2015 05:52:24 +0000 The Rewards of an Ethical Culture https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/corporate-governance/banking-conduct-and-culture/739-nyfed-1?format=html The Rewards of an Ethical Culture Let me begin by thanking Sir William Blair and the Bank of England for inviting me to participate in this Project and at this Conference. At the New York Fed, we have made ethical culture a priority for financial services. We have done this not as a formal part of a supervisory program, but more as a call for reform. In the short time that I have this afternoon, I will speak about the reasons why I believe reform is necessary, highlight some of the important practical features of a strong ethical culture, and conclude by setting out a few of the rewards that might result from it.

]]> https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/corporate-governance/banking-conduct-and-culture/739-nyfed-1?format=html Let me begin by thanking Sir William Blair and the Bank of England for inviting me to participate in this Project and at this Conference. At the New York Fed, we have made ethical culture a priority for financial services. We have done this not as a formal part of a supervisory program, but more as a call for reform. In the short time that I have this afternoon, I will speak about the reasons why I believe reform is necessary, highlight some of the important practical features of a strong ethical culture, and conclude by setting out a few of the rewards that might result from it.

]]> (Anonymous) III.1.1 Banking conduct and culture Mon, 19 Jan 2015 13:48:12 +0000 Basel Capital Framework National Discretions https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/capital-management-and-sufficiency/614-d297-3?format=html Basel Capital Framework National Discretions The Basel capital framework contains a number of national discretions to allow the standards to be implemented differently by authorities in different jurisdictions. This can be useful when differences in the structure and development of financial systems warrant different approaches. In practice, however, the Committee recognises that the use of national discretions can also impair the comparability of implementation across jurisdictions, particularly if supervisors do not implement them with the same conservatism. This was highlighted by three recent studies on the variation of risk-weighted assets in the banking book and trading book.

]]> https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/capital-management-and-sufficiency/614-d297-3?format=html The Basel capital framework contains a number of national discretions to allow the standards to be implemented differently by authorities in different jurisdictions. This can be useful when differences in the structure and development of financial systems warrant different approaches. In practice, however, the Committee recognises that the use of national discretions can also impair the comparability of implementation across jurisdictions, particularly if supervisors do not implement them with the same conservatism. This was highlighted by three recent studies on the variation of risk-weighted assets in the banking book and trading book.

]]> (Anonymous) III.2 Capital management and sufficiency Fri, 31 Oct 2014 13:28:11 +0000 Speech by Gov. Tarullo on good compliance https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/corporate-governance/banking-conduct-and-culture/733-good-compliance-not-mere-compliance?format=html Speech by Gov. Tarullo on good compliance In the aftermath of the financial crisis, ongoing increases in capital buffers, reductions in funding vulnerabilities, improvements in risk management, and attention to orderly resolution are producing a substantially more resilient financial system. Yet even as the financial position of firms has been strengthened, headlines describing misconduct in financial firms have appeared with disturbing regularity. For a time, these stories were the legacy of pre-crisis errors and misdeeds, with a focus on the mortgages and mortgage-related products that lay at the heart of the crisis. But soon they were accompanied by allegations of post-crisis actions: rigging of LIBOR (London interbank offered rate) and foreign exchange rates, facilitation of tax evasion, inadequate controls on money laundering, and front running through dark pools, among others.

]]> https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/corporate-governance/banking-conduct-and-culture/733-good-compliance-not-mere-compliance?format=html In the aftermath of the financial crisis, ongoing increases in capital buffers, reductions in funding vulnerabilities, improvements in risk management, and attention to orderly resolution are producing a substantially more resilient financial system. Yet even as the financial position of firms has been strengthened, headlines describing misconduct in financial firms have appeared with disturbing regularity. For a time, these stories were the legacy of pre-crisis errors and misdeeds, with a focus on the mortgages and mortgage-related products that lay at the heart of the crisis. But soon they were accompanied by allegations of post-crisis actions: rigging of LIBOR (London interbank offered rate) and foreign exchange rates, facilitation of tax evasion, inadequate controls on money laundering, and front running through dark pools, among others.

]]> (Anonymous) III.1.1 Banking conduct and culture Mon, 20 Oct 2014 04:23:32 +0000 Supervisory Interaction on risk Culture https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/corporate-governance/banking-conduct-and-culture/736-fsb-1?format=html Supervisory Interaction on risk Culture Increasing the intensity and effectiveness of supervision is a key component of the Financial Stability Board’s (FSB’s) efforts to reduce the moral hazard posed by systemically important financial institutions (the SIFI Framework), along with requiring added capital loss absorbency and facilitating the orderly resolution of financial institutions. The FSB issued its first recommendations for enhanced supervision of financial institutions, in particular SIFIs, in October 2010, which underscored the key preconditions for effective supervision, including the need for (i) strong and unambiguous mandates; (ii) independence to act; (iii) sufficient quality and quantity of resources; and (iv) supervisors having a full suite of powers to execute on their mandate. Subsequent recommendations in 2011 and 2012 strengthened the supervisory expectations for financial institutions’ risk governance, internal controls and risk management functions, as well as risk data aggregation and risk reporting capabilities. A number of these recommendations have been implemented and, collectively, have raised the bar for both supervisors and SIFIs. 

]]> https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/corporate-governance/banking-conduct-and-culture/736-fsb-1?format=html Increasing the intensity and effectiveness of supervision is a key component of the Financial Stability Board’s (FSB’s) efforts to reduce the moral hazard posed by systemically important financial institutions (the SIFI Framework), along with requiring added capital loss absorbency and facilitating the orderly resolution of financial institutions. The FSB issued its first recommendations for enhanced supervision of financial institutions, in particular SIFIs, in October 2010, which underscored the key preconditions for effective supervision, including the need for (i) strong and unambiguous mandates; (ii) independence to act; (iii) sufficient quality and quantity of resources; and (iv) supervisors having a full suite of powers to execute on their mandate. Subsequent recommendations in 2011 and 2012 strengthened the supervisory expectations for financial institutions’ risk governance, internal controls and risk management functions, as well as risk data aggregation and risk reporting capabilities. A number of these recommendations have been implemented and, collectively, have raised the bar for both supervisors and SIFIs. 

]]> (Anonymous) III.1.1 Banking conduct and culture Sun, 06 Apr 2014 22:34:16 +0000 Capital Requirements for Bank Exposures to Central Counterparties https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/capital-management-and-sufficiency/612-bcbs282-2?format=html Capital Requirements for Bank Exposures to Central Counterparties This document presents the Basel Committee’s revised policy framework for the capital treatment of bank exposures to central counterparties (CCPs). Revisions to the framework were made to reflect decisions reached by the Committee after evaluating the results of the joint quantitative impact study (JQIS) and the feedback received from respondents to a related consultative document published in June 2013. The Committee wishes to thank institutions that participated in the JQIS as well as respondents to the consultative document.

]]> https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/capital-management-and-sufficiency/612-bcbs282-2?format=html This document presents the Basel Committee’s revised policy framework for the capital treatment of bank exposures to central counterparties (CCPs). Revisions to the framework were made to reflect decisions reached by the Committee after evaluating the results of the joint quantitative impact study (JQIS) and the feedback received from respondents to a related consultative document published in June 2013. The Committee wishes to thank institutions that participated in the JQIS as well as respondents to the consultative document.

]]> (Anonymous) III.2 Capital management and sufficiency Mon, 31 Mar 2014 13:22:19 +0000 Guidance on External Audits of Banks https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/auditoria-interna/626-bcbs280?format=html Guidance on External Audits of Banks The recent financial crisis not only revealed weaknesses in risk management, control and governance processes at banks, but also highlighted the need to improve the quality of external audits of banks. External auditors of banks can play an important role in contributing to financial stability when they deliver quality bank audits which foster market confidence in banks’ financial statements. Quality bank audits are also a valuable input in the supervisory process. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the Committee, or BCBS) is issuing this document on external audits of banks to improve external audit quality of banks and enhance the effectiveness of prudential supervision, which contribute to financial stability. This document replaces the documents The relationship between banking supervisors and banks’ external auditors (January 2002)1 and External audit quality and banking supervision (December 2008).

]]> https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/auditoria-interna/626-bcbs280?format=html The recent financial crisis not only revealed weaknesses in risk management, control and governance processes at banks, but also highlighted the need to improve the quality of external audits of banks. External auditors of banks can play an important role in contributing to financial stability when they deliver quality bank audits which foster market confidence in banks’ financial statements. Quality bank audits are also a valuable input in the supervisory process. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the Committee, or BCBS) is issuing this document on external audits of banks to improve external audit quality of banks and enhance the effectiveness of prudential supervision, which contribute to financial stability. This document replaces the documents The relationship between banking supervisors and banks’ external auditors (January 2002)1 and External audit quality and banking supervision (December 2008).

]]> (Anonymous) III.5 Internal Audit Fri, 28 Feb 2014 19:36:12 +0000 Sound Practices of a Sound Capital Planning Process https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/capital-management-and-sufficiency/611-bcbs277-3?format=html Sound Practices of a Sound Capital Planning Process An important lesson from the financial crisis concerned the need for banking organisations (“banks”) to strengthen their capital planning processes. Some of the observed weaknesses reflected banks’ processes that were not sufficiently comprehensive, appropriately forward-looking or adequately formalised. As a result, some management teams underestimated the risks inherent in their banks’ business strategies and, in turn, misjudged capital needs.

]]> https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/capital-management-and-sufficiency/611-bcbs277-3?format=html An important lesson from the financial crisis concerned the need for banking organisations (“banks”) to strengthen their capital planning processes. Some of the observed weaknesses reflected banks’ processes that were not sufficiently comprehensive, appropriately forward-looking or adequately formalised. As a result, some management teams underestimated the risks inherent in their banks’ business strategies and, in turn, misjudged capital needs.

]]> (Anonymous) III.2 Capital management and sufficiency Tue, 31 Dec 2013 23:20:44 +0000 Capital Requirements for Banks Equity Investments in Funds https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/capital-management-and-sufficiency/610-bcbs266?format=html Capital Requirements for Banks Equity Investments in Funds This document presents the Basel Committee’s final policy framework for calculating the capital requirements for banks’ equity investments in funds that are held in their banking book, including text for the final standard. This follows the consultative document published in July 2013.1 The Committee wishes to thank respondents for their comments in this regard.

]]> https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/capital-management-and-sufficiency/610-bcbs266?format=html This document presents the Basel Committee’s final policy framework for calculating the capital requirements for banks’ equity investments in funds that are held in their banking book, including text for the final standard. This follows the consultative document published in July 2013.1 The Committee wishes to thank respondents for their comments in this regard.

]]> (Anonymous) III.2 Capital management and sufficiency Sat, 30 Nov 2013 10:18:54 +0000 Modelling integrity through culture https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/corporate-governance/banking-conduct-and-culture/732-fca-uk-modelling-integrity-through-culture?format=html Modelling integrity through culture Speech by Martin Wheatley, Chief Executive of the FCA, at the FCA Markets Conference 2013. This is the text of the speech as drafted, which may differ from the delivered version.

]]> https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/corporate-governance/banking-conduct-and-culture/732-fca-uk-modelling-integrity-through-culture?format=html Speech by Martin Wheatley, Chief Executive of the FCA, at the FCA Markets Conference 2013. This is the text of the speech as drafted, which may differ from the delivered version.

]]> (Anonymous) III.1.1 Banking conduct and culture Tue, 19 Nov 2013 03:20:54 +0000 Principles for Effective Risk Appetite https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/corporate-governance/banking-conduct-and-culture/734-fsb-2?format=html Principles for Effective Risk Appetite Increasing the intensity and effectiveness of supervision is a key component of the Financial Stability Board’s (FSB’s) framework, endorsed by G20 Leaders, to reduce the moral hazard of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). As such, supervisory expectations for risk management particularly at SIFIs are increasing. The October 2011 FSB progress report on enhanced supervision noted that effective risk appetite frameworks (RAFs) that are actionable and measurable by both financial institutions and supervisors have not yet been widely adopted. It concluded that the development of an effective RAF is important for financial institutions and supervisors, and needs attention by both. The report recommended that supervisors discuss expectations for what a “good” risk appetite framework entails and how to supervise against these expectations.

]]> https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/corporate-governance/banking-conduct-and-culture/734-fsb-2?format=html Increasing the intensity and effectiveness of supervision is a key component of the Financial Stability Board’s (FSB’s) framework, endorsed by G20 Leaders, to reduce the moral hazard of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). As such, supervisory expectations for risk management particularly at SIFIs are increasing. The October 2011 FSB progress report on enhanced supervision noted that effective risk appetite frameworks (RAFs) that are actionable and measurable by both financial institutions and supervisors have not yet been widely adopted. It concluded that the development of an effective RAF is important for financial institutions and supervisors, and needs attention by both. The report recommended that supervisors discuss expectations for what a “good” risk appetite framework entails and how to supervise against these expectations.

]]> (Anonymous) III.1.1 Banking conduct and culture Sun, 17 Nov 2013 20:28:22 +0000 G30-Banking Conduct and culture https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/corporate-governance/banking-conduct-and-culture/737-g30-3?format=html G30-Banking Conduct and culture Banks and banking rely on trust. And while trust takes years to establish, it can be lost in a moment through failures caused by problematic ethics, values, and behaviors.

Events that precipitated the global financial crisis and the subsequent issues that have emerged have revealed a multitude of cultural failures. This report recognizes that problematic cultural norms, and subcultures within large banks, have caused widespread reputational damage and loss of public trust. These events have been economically costly to firms in terms of fines, litigation, and regulatory action.

]]> https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/corporate-governance/banking-conduct-and-culture/737-g30-3?format=html Banks and banking rely on trust. And while trust takes years to establish, it can be lost in a moment through failures caused by problematic ethics, values, and behaviors.

Events that precipitated the global financial crisis and the subsequent issues that have emerged have revealed a multitude of cultural failures. This report recognizes that problematic cultural norms, and subcultures within large banks, have caused widespread reputational damage and loss of public trust. These events have been economically costly to firms in terms of fines, litigation, and regulatory action.

]]> (Anonymous) III.1.1 Banking conduct and culture Mon, 30 Sep 2013 22:36:47 +0000 New Paradigm Boards and Supervisors https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/corporate-governance/banking-conduct-and-culture/738-g30-2?format=html New Paradigm Boards and Supervisors In 2012, the Group of Thirty (G30) published Toward Effective Governance of Financial Institutions, which showed how weak and ineffective governance in systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) contributed to what the report called “the massive failure of financial sector decision making that led to the global financial crisis” (p. 5). In reaction to that report, the supervisory and Financial Stability Board community urged the G30 to provide additional insights into how interactions between boards and supervisors could be enhanced, and how the issue of strengthening and assessing risk culture could be tackled, particularly for SIFIs. This publication provides that information.

]]> https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/corporate-governance/banking-conduct-and-culture/738-g30-2?format=html In 2012, the Group of Thirty (G30) published Toward Effective Governance of Financial Institutions, which showed how weak and ineffective governance in systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) contributed to what the report called “the massive failure of financial sector decision making that led to the global financial crisis” (p. 5). In reaction to that report, the supervisory and Financial Stability Board community urged the G30 to provide additional insights into how interactions between boards and supervisors could be enhanced, and how the issue of strengthening and assessing risk culture could be tackled, particularly for SIFIs. This publication provides that information.

]]> (Anonymous) III.1.1 Banking conduct and culture Mon, 30 Sep 2013 16:39:02 +0000 Updated Methodology and the Higher Loss Absorbency Requirement https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/capital-management-and-sufficiency/608-bcbs255-3?format=html Updated Methodology and the Higher Loss Absorbency Requirement This document updates and replaces the November 2011 publication Global systemically important banks: assessment methodology and the additional loss absorbency requirement. Below is a summary of the main changes relative to that publication. These changes reflect the lessons learnt from applying the assessment methodology using data submitted by banks in respect of their positions as at the financial year-ends 2009 to 2011. The changes also include the addition of the disclosures that banks are required to make to ensure that the assessment methodology operates on the basis of publicly available information.

]]> https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/aspects-related-to-prudential-management-and-direction/capital-management-and-sufficiency/608-bcbs255-3?format=html This document updates and replaces the November 2011 publication Global systemically important banks: assessment methodology and the additional loss absorbency requirement. Below is a summary of the main changes relative to that publication. These changes reflect the lessons learnt from applying the assessment methodology using data submitted by banks in respect of their positions as at the financial year-ends 2009 to 2011. The changes also include the addition of the disclosures that banks are required to make to ensure that the assessment methodology operates on the basis of publicly available information.

]]> (Anonymous) III.2 Capital management and sufficiency Sun, 30 Jun 2013 19:15:48 +0000