https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/disclosure-and-transparency?format=html Mon, 02 Jan 2017 18:58:38 +0000 en-GB hourly 1 https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/disclosure-and-transparency/1416-frequently-asked-questions-on-the-revised-pillar-3-disclosure-requirements?format=html FAQs on the Revised Pillar 3 Disclosure Requirements The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has received a number of interpretation questions related to some terms of previous documentation related to the Revised Pillar 3 Disclosure Requirements. To help ensure consistent global implementation of its standards, the Committee has agreed to periodically review frequently asked questions and publish their answers, along with any technical elaboration of the standards and interpretative guidance that may be necessary. The questions and answers for the Revised Pillar 3 Disclosure Requirements are grouped into this document in the following fields: 1. Overview of risk management and RWA; 2. Linkages between financial statements and regulatory exposures; 3. Credit risk; 4. Counterparty credit risk; 5. Securitizations, and 6. Market Risk. 

]]> https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/disclosure-and-transparency/1416-frequently-asked-questions-on-the-revised-pillar-3-disclosure-requirements?format=html The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has received a number of interpretation questions related to some terms of previous documentation related to the Revised Pillar 3 Disclosure Requirements. To help ensure consistent global implementation of its standards, the Committee has agreed to periodically review frequently asked questions and publish their answers, along with any technical elaboration of the standards and interpretative guidance that may be necessary. The questions and answers for the Revised Pillar 3 Disclosure Requirements are grouped into this document in the following fields: 1. Overview of risk management and RWA; 2. Linkages between financial statements and regulatory exposures; 3. Credit risk; 4. Counterparty credit risk; 5. Securitizations, and 6. Market Risk. 

]]> (Anonymous) VI. Disclosure and transparency Mon, 02 Jan 2017 18:58:38 +0000 https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/disclosure-and-transparency/717-d125-1?format=html Public Quantitative Disclosure Standards for Central Counterparts The CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures (PFMI)1 states that financial market infrastructures (FMIs) should provide relevant information to participants, relevant authorities and the broader public. Quantitative data are important components of the set of public disclosures that is expected of FMIs as part of satisfying the PFMI. This document sets out the public quantitative disclosure standards that central counterparties (CCPs) are expected to meet. These standards complement the Disclosure framework published by CPSS and IOSCO in December 2012.

]]> https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/disclosure-and-transparency/717-d125-1?format=html The CPSS-IOSCO Principles for financial market infrastructures (PFMI)1 states that financial market infrastructures (FMIs) should provide relevant information to participants, relevant authorities and the broader public. Quantitative data are important components of the set of public disclosures that is expected of FMIs as part of satisfying the PFMI. This document sets out the public quantitative disclosure standards that central counterparties (CCPs) are expected to meet. These standards complement the Disclosure framework published by CPSS and IOSCO in December 2012.

]]> (Anonymous) VI. Disclosure and transparency Sun, 01 Feb 2015 09:23:00 +0000 https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/disclosure-and-transparency/718-d309-6?format=html Revised Pillar 3 Disclosure Requirements Market discipline has long been recognised as a key objective of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (hereafter the “Committee” or “BCBS”). The provision of meaningful information about common key risk metrics to market participants is a fundamental tenet of a sound banking system. It reduces information asymmetry and helps promote comparability of banks’ risk profiles within and across jurisdictions. Pillar 3 of the Basel framework aims to promote market discipline through regulatory disclosure requirements. These requirements enable market participants to access key information relating to a bank’s regulatory capital and risk exposures in order to increase transparency and confidence about a bank’s exposure to risk and the overall adequacy of its regulatory capital.

]]> https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/disclosure-and-transparency/718-d309-6?format=html Market discipline has long been recognised as a key objective of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (hereafter the “Committee” or “BCBS”). The provision of meaningful information about common key risk metrics to market participants is a fundamental tenet of a sound banking system. It reduces information asymmetry and helps promote comparability of banks’ risk profiles within and across jurisdictions. Pillar 3 of the Basel framework aims to promote market discipline through regulatory disclosure requirements. These requirements enable market participants to access key information relating to a bank’s regulatory capital and risk exposures in order to increase transparency and confidence about a bank’s exposure to risk and the overall adequacy of its regulatory capital.

]]> (Anonymous) VI. Disclosure and transparency Thu, 01 Jan 2015 09:26:14 +0000 https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/disclosure-and-transparency/715-basel-iii-leverage-ratio-framework-and-disclosure-requirements-1?format=html Basel III Leverage Ratio Framework and Disclosure Requirements An underlying cause of the global financial crisis was the build-up of excessive on- and off-balance sheet leverage in the banking system. In many cases, banks built up excessive leverage while apparently maintaining strong risk-based capital ratios. At the height of the crisis, financial markets forced the banking sector to reduce its leverage in a manner that amplified downward pressures on asset prices. This deleveraging process exacerbated the feedback loop between losses, falling bank capital and shrinking credit availability.

]]> https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/disclosure-and-transparency/715-basel-iii-leverage-ratio-framework-and-disclosure-requirements-1?format=html An underlying cause of the global financial crisis was the build-up of excessive on- and off-balance sheet leverage in the banking system. In many cases, banks built up excessive leverage while apparently maintaining strong risk-based capital ratios. At the height of the crisis, financial markets forced the banking sector to reduce its leverage in a manner that amplified downward pressures on asset prices. This deleveraging process exacerbated the feedback loop between losses, falling bank capital and shrinking credit availability.

]]> (Anonymous) VI. Disclosure and transparency Wed, 01 Jan 2014 16:19:45 +0000 https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/disclosure-and-transparency/716-bcbs272-2?format=html Liquidity Coverage Ratio Disclosure Standards The fundamental role of banks in financial intermediation makes them inherently vulnerable to liquidity risk, of both an institution-specific and a market nature. Financial market developments have increased the complexity of liquidity risk and its management. During the early “liquidity phase” of the financial crisis that began in 2007, many banks – despite meeting existing capital requirements then in effect – experienced difficulties because they did not manage their liquidity in a prudent manner. The difficulties experienced by some banks, which, in some cases, created significant contagion effects to the broader financial system, were due to lapses in basic principles of liquidity risk measurement and management.

]]> https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/disclosure-and-transparency/716-bcbs272-2?format=html The fundamental role of banks in financial intermediation makes them inherently vulnerable to liquidity risk, of both an institution-specific and a market nature. Financial market developments have increased the complexity of liquidity risk and its management. During the early “liquidity phase” of the financial crisis that began in 2007, many banks – despite meeting existing capital requirements then in effect – experienced difficulties because they did not manage their liquidity in a prudent manner. The difficulties experienced by some banks, which, in some cases, created significant contagion effects to the broader financial system, were due to lapses in basic principles of liquidity risk measurement and management.

]]> (Anonymous) VI. Disclosure and transparency Wed, 01 Jan 2014 09:20:56 +0000 https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/disclosure-and-transparency/714-bcbs239-4?format=html Principles for Effective Risk Data Aggregation and Risk Reporting One of the most significant lessons learned from the global financial crisis that began in 2007 was that banks’ information technology (IT) and data architectures were inadequate to support the broad management of financial risks. Many banks lacked the ability to aggregate risk exposures and identify concentrations quickly and accurately at the bank group level, across business lines and between legal entities. Some banks were unable to manage their risks properly because of weak risk data aggregation capabilities and risk reporting practices. This had severe consequences to the banks themselves and to the stability of the financial system as a whole.

]]> https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/disclosure-and-transparency/714-bcbs239-4?format=html One of the most significant lessons learned from the global financial crisis that began in 2007 was that banks’ information technology (IT) and data architectures were inadequate to support the broad management of financial risks. Many banks lacked the ability to aggregate risk exposures and identify concentrations quickly and accurately at the bank group level, across business lines and between legal entities. Some banks were unable to manage their risks properly because of weak risk data aggregation capabilities and risk reporting practices. This had severe consequences to the banks themselves and to the stability of the financial system as a whole.

]]> (Anonymous) VI. Disclosure and transparency Tue, 01 Jan 2013 09:18:03 +0000 https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/disclosure-and-transparency/712-composition-of-capital-disclosure-requirements?format=html Composition of Capital Disclosure Requirements (Rules Text) During the financial crisis, many market participants and supervisors attempted to undertake detailed assessments of the capital positions of banks and comparisons of their capital positions on a cross jurisdictional basis. The level of detail of the disclosure and the lack of consistency in the way that it was reported typically made this task difficult and often made it impossible to do with any accuracy. It is often suggested that lack of clarity on the quality of capital contributed to uncertainty during the financial crisis. Furthermore, the interventions carried out by the authorities may have been more effective if capital positions of the banks were more transparent.

]]> https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/disclosure-and-transparency/712-composition-of-capital-disclosure-requirements?format=html During the financial crisis, many market participants and supervisors attempted to undertake detailed assessments of the capital positions of banks and comparisons of their capital positions on a cross jurisdictional basis. The level of detail of the disclosure and the lack of consistency in the way that it was reported typically made this task difficult and often made it impossible to do with any accuracy. It is often suggested that lack of clarity on the quality of capital contributed to uncertainty during the financial crisis. Furthermore, the interventions carried out by the authorities may have been more effective if capital positions of the banks were more transparent.

]]> (Anonymous) VI. Disclosure and transparency Fri, 01 Jun 2012 10:15:41 +0000 https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/disclosure-and-transparency/711-pillar-3-disclosure-requirements-for-remuneration-2?format=html Pillar 3 Disclosure Requirements for Remuneration In July 2009, as part of its Enhancements to the Basel II framework, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision introduced supplemental Pillar 2 guidance to address a number of risk management weaknesses revealed during the financial crisis that began in 2007. In this context, the Committee notably incorporated within Pillar 2 the Financial Stability Board’s Principles for Sound Compensation Practices, which were issued in April 2009 to improve compensation practices and strengthen supervision in this area. Paragrapah 94 of the supplemental Pillar 2 guidance included the principle that “Firms must disclose clear, comprehensive and timely information about their compensation practices to facilitate constructive engagement by all stakeholders, including in particular shareholders”.

]]> https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/disclosure-and-transparency/711-pillar-3-disclosure-requirements-for-remuneration-2?format=html In July 2009, as part of its Enhancements to the Basel II framework, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision introduced supplemental Pillar 2 guidance to address a number of risk management weaknesses revealed during the financial crisis that began in 2007. In this context, the Committee notably incorporated within Pillar 2 the Financial Stability Board’s Principles for Sound Compensation Practices, which were issued in April 2009 to improve compensation practices and strengthen supervision in this area. Paragrapah 94 of the supplemental Pillar 2 guidance included the principle that “Firms must disclose clear, comprehensive and timely information about their compensation practices to facilitate constructive engagement by all stakeholders, including in particular shareholders”.

]]> (Anonymous) VI. Disclosure and transparency Fri, 01 Jul 2011 16:14:07 +0000 https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/disclosure-and-transparency/710-bcbs188-3?format=html Basel III Intl Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement Standards & Monitoring This document presents the liquidity portion of the Basel Committee’s reforms to strengthen global capital and liquidity regulations with the goal of promoting a more resilient banking sector. The objective of the reforms is to improve the banking sector’s ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and economic stress, whatever the source, thus reducing the risk of spillover from the financial sector to the real economy. This document sets out the rules text and timelines to implement the liquidity portion of the Basel III framework.

]]> https://asbaweb.net/en/bibl/disclosure-and-transparency/710-bcbs188-3?format=html This document presents the liquidity portion of the Basel Committee’s reforms to strengthen global capital and liquidity regulations with the goal of promoting a more resilient banking sector. The objective of the reforms is to improve the banking sector’s ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and economic stress, whatever the source, thus reducing the risk of spillover from the financial sector to the real economy. This document sets out the rules text and timelines to implement the liquidity portion of the Basel III framework.

]]> (Anonymous) VI. Disclosure and transparency Wed, 01 Dec 2010 09:12:13 +0000