III.1 Gobierno Corporativo - Asociación de Supervisores Bancarios de las Américas

Creating a Culture of Risk Management

(Anónimo) — Wed, 18 Nov 2015 16:46:07 +0000

After the rash of corporate and accounting scandals leading up to the Sarbanes Oxley Act in 2002, a “Culture of Compliance” emerged to foster ethical behavior and decision-making. The culture of compliance goes beyond having good policies and procedures, a dedicated compliance staff, sufficient compliance resources or electronic exception reports. It articulates a sense of responsibility for compliance at every level of the organization.
(Texto en inglés)

G30-New Paradigm Boards and Supervisors

(Anónimo) — Tue, 30 Jun 2015 08:10:56 +0000

In 2012, the Group of Thirty (G30) published Toward Effective Governance of Financial Institutions, which showed how weak and ineffective governance in systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) contributed to what the report called “the massive failure of financial sector decision making that led to the global financial crisis” (p. 5). In reaction to that report, the supervisory and Financial Stability Board community urged the G30 to provide additional insights into how interactions between boards and supervisors could be enhanced, and how the issue of strengthening and assessing risk culture could be tackled, particularly for SIFIs. This publication provides that information.
(Texto en inglés)

Corporate governance principles for banks

(Anónimo) — Mon, 29 Jun 2015 20:50:06 +0000

Effective corporate governance is critical to the proper functioning of the banking sector and the economy as a whole. Banks perform a crucial role in the economy by intermediating funds from savers and depositors to activities that support enterprise and help drive economic growth. Banks’ safety and soundness are key to financial stability, and the manner in which they conduct their business, therefore, is central to economic health. Governance weaknesses at banks that play a significant role in the financial system can result in the transmission of problems across the banking sector and the economy as a whole.
(Texto en inglés)

Corporate governance principles for banks

(Anónimo) — Mon, 29 Jun 2015 14:47:03 +0000

The primary objective of corporate governance should be safeguarding stakeholders’ interest in conformity with public interest on a sustainable basis. Among stakeholders, particularly with respect to retail banks, shareholders’ interest would be secondary to depositors' interest. Effective corporate governance is critical to the proper functioning of the banking sector and the economy as a whole.
(Texto en inglés)

The Rewards of an Ethical Culture

(Anónimo) — Mon, 19 Jan 2015 10:17:28 +0000

Let me begin by thanking Sir William Blair and the Bank of England for inviting me to participate in this Project and at this Conference1. At the New York Fed, we have made ethical culture a priority for financial services. We have done this not as a formal part of a supervisory program, but more as a call for reform. In the short time that I have this afternoon, I will speak about the reasons why I believe reform is necessary, highlight some of the important practical features of a strong ethical culture, and conclude by setting out a few of the rewards that might result from it.
(Texto en inglés)

Good Compliance, Not Mere Compliance

(Anónimo) — Sun, 19 Oct 2014 08:02:43 +0000

In the aftermath of the financial crisis, ongoing increases in capital buffers, reductions in funding vulnerabilities, improvements in risk management, and attention to orderly resolution are producing a substantially more resilient financial system. Yet even as the financial position of firms has been strengthened, headlines describing misconduct in financial firms have appeared with disturbing regularity. For a time, these stories were the legacy of pre-crisis errors and misdeeds, with a focus on the mortgages and mortgage-related products that lay at the heart of the crisis. But soon they were accompanied by allegations of post-crisis actions: rigging of LIBOR (London interbank offered rate) and foreign exchange rates, facilitation of tax evasion, inadequate controls on money laundering, and front running through dark pools, among others.
(Texto en inglés)

Guidance on Supervisory Interaction with Financial Institutions on Risk Culture

(Anónimo) — Sun, 06 Apr 2014 14:08:00 +0000

Increasing the intensity and effectiveness of supervision is a key component of the Financial Stability Board’s (FSB’s) efforts to reduce the moral hazard posed by systemically important financial institutions (the SIFI Framework), along with requiring added capital loss absorbency and facilitating the orderly resolution of financial institutions. The FSB issued its first recommendations for enhanced supervision of financial institutions, in particular SIFIs, in October 2010, which underscored the key preconditions for effective supervision, including the need for (i) strong and unambiguous mandates; (ii) independence to act; (iii) sufficient quality and quantity of resources; and (iv) supervisors having a full suite of powers to execute on their mandate. Subsequent recommendations in 2011 and 2012 strengthened the supervisory expectations for financial institutions’ risk governance, internal controls and risk management functions, as well as risk data aggregation and risk reporting capabilities.
(Texto en inglés)

Modelling integrity through culture

(Anónimo) — Mon, 18 Nov 2013 10:00:39 +0000

Speech by Martin Wheatley, Chief Executive of the FCA, at the FCA Markets Conference 2013. This is the text of the speech as drafted, which may differ from the delivered version.
(Texto en inglés)

Principles for An Effective Risk Appetite Framework

(Anónimo) — Sun, 17 Nov 2013 03:06:01 +0000

Increasing the intensity and effectiveness of supervision is a key component of the Financial Stability Board’s (FSB’s) framework, endorsed by G20 Leaders, to reduce the moral hazard of systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). As such, supervisory expectations for risk management particularly at SIFIs are increasing. The October 2011 FSB progress report on enhanced supervision noted that effective risk appetite frameworks (RAFs) that are actionable and measurable by both financial institutions and supervisors have not yet been widely adopted. It concluded that the development of an effective RAF is important for financial institutions and supervisors, and needs attention by both. The report recommended that supervisors discuss expectations for what a “good” risk appetite framework entails and how to supervise against these expectations.
(Texto en inglés)

BANKING CONDUCT and CULTURE: A Call for Sustained and Comprehensive Reform

(Anónimo) — Mon, 30 Sep 2013 14:15:37 +0000

Banks and banking rely on trust. And while trust takes years to establish, it can be lost in a moment through failures caused by problematic ethics, values, and behaviors. Events that precipitated the global financial crisis and the subsequent issues that have emerged have revealed a multitude of cultural failures. This report recognizes that problematic cultural norms, and subcultures within large banks, have caused widespread reputational damage and loss of public trust. These events have been economically costly to firms in terms of fines, litigation, and regulatory action.

(Texto en inglés)

The importance of culture in driving behaviours of firms and how the FCA will assess this

(Anónimo) — Wed, 17 Jul 2013 01:38:29 +0000

Speech by Clive Adamson, Director of Supervision, the FCA, at the CFA Society - UK Professionalism Conference, London. This is the text of the speech as drafted, which may differ from the delivered version.(Texto en inglés)

Propuesta de Regulación y Guía de Supervisión del Gobierno Corporativo

(Anónimo) — Mon, 31 Dec 2012 10:45:07 +0000

La región de las Américas ha enfrentado diversas crisis financieras que le han motivado a discutir y promover cambios en la regulación y supervisión del sistema financiero para preservar la estabilidad. El Gobierno Corporativo se encuentra entre los aspectos que los reguladores bancarios deben considerar, ya que la aplicación de buenas prácticas en esta área tiene una gran relevancia para el éxito de una institución y para el sistema en su conjunto.

Gobierno Corporativo en Agencias de Supervisión de Bancos

(Anónimo) — Wed, 31 Aug 2011 20:41:31 +0000

En décadas pasadas, varios países de la región sufrieron la experiencia de una crisis financiera. Las causas de las mismas fueron múltiples y se atribuyeron generalmente a desajustes macroeconómicos, a debilidades de la estructura financiera y de gobierno de las entidades vigiladas, e incluso, a una regulación financiera más orientada al establecimiento de estándares contables que al manejo de riesgos.

EBA Guidelines on Internal Governance

(Anónimo) — Tue, 30 Aug 2011 20:43:34 +0000

Internal governance for institutions in the European Community is covered by Article 22 of Directive 2006/48/EC, which requires, that every credit institution has robust governance arrangements, which include a clear organisational structure with well defined, transparent and consistent lines of responsibility, effective processes to identify, manage, monitor and report the risks it is or might be exposed to, adequate internal control mechanisms, including sound administrative and accounting procedures, and remuneration policies and practices that are consistent with and promote sound and effective risk management.
(Texto en inglés)

Guía para la adopción de principios de buen gobierno en instituciones microfinancieras

(Anónimo) — Tue, 01 Mar 2011 00:37:02 +0000

La Fundación Microfinanzas BBVA contribuye con su actividad al desarrollo económico y social sostenible de las personas más desfavorecidas de la sociedad, a través de las microfinanzas productivas. Asimismo, la Fundación trabaja para impulsar el desarrollo del sector microfinanciero, con el fin de que los productos y servicios financieros puedan llegar a más personas y en mejores condiciones. Con este objetivo, la Fundación tiene en marcha varias líneas de trabajo, entre las que destaca el fortalecimiento del gobierno corporativo en el sector microfinanciero.

Código Universal de Gobierno Corporativo para Instituciones Microfinancieras

(Anónimo) — Mon, 28 Feb 2011 17:34:20 +0000

Principles for enhancing corporate governance

(Anónimo) — Thu, 30 Sep 2010 14:32:08 +0000

Given the important financial intermediation role of banks in an economy, the public and the market have a high degree of sensitivity to any difficulties potentially arising from any corporate governance shortcomings in banks. Corporate governance is thus of great relevance both to individual banking organisations and to the international financial system as a whole, and merits targeted supervisory guidance.

(Texto en inglés)

Compensation Principles and Standards Assessment Methodology

(Anónimo) — Wed, 30 Dec 2009 06:48:30 +0000

This assessment methodology aims to guide supervisors in reviewing individual firms’ compensation practices and assessing their compliance with the FSB Principles for Sound Compensation Practices (“the Principles”) and their implementation standards (“the Standards”). The objective is to foster supervisory approaches that are effective in promoting sound compensation practices at significant financial firms and help support a level playing field.
(Texto en inglés)

FSB Principles for Sound Compensation Practices

(Anónimo) — Wed, 23 Sep 2009 20:52:09 +0000

Compensation at significant financial institutions is one factor among many that contributed to the financial crisis that began in 2007. Official action to address unsound compensation systems must therefore be embedded in the broader financial regulatory reform program, built around a substantially stronger and more resilient global capital and liquidity framework. Action in all major financial centres must be speedy, determined and coherent. Urgency is particularly important to prevent a return to the compensation practices that contributed to the crisis.
(Texto en inglés)

FSF Principles for Sound Compensation Practices

(Anónimo) — Wed, 01 Apr 2009 14:53:30 +0000

Compensation practices at large financial institutions are one factor among many that contributed to the financial crisis that began in 2007. High short-term profits led to generous bonus payments to employees without adequate regard to the longer-term risks they imposed on their firms. These perverse incentives amplified the excessive risk-taking that severely threatened the global financial system and left firms with fewer resources to absorb losses as risks materialised. The lack of attention to risk also contributed to the large, in some cases extreme absolute level of compensation in the industry.
(Texto en inglés)